Of the three types of creativity (combinational, exploratory,a nd transformational), only the first has been significantly illuminated by neuroscience. And event hat is not fully understood in neural terms. The other twoare evenmore recalcitrant. This is due to the difficulty in defining the styles of thinking, and in identifying the various computational processes that are involved. One key problem is the fact that hierarchical systems cannot yet be effectively simulated in connectionist models.
grammatical sentences, either,n or howw ei nterpret photographs as depicting specific scenes. In general, much more goes on in our minds belowt he levelo fc onsciousness than can everb e accessed by it. (Were that not so, we'dbeparalysed by information overload.) Psychology faces "introspective mystery" in all areas of mental life.
The main difficulty in solving the puzzle of creativity is not--as is also widely believed--that it is unpredictable. Creativity is indeed largely unpredictable, for a number of different reasons (Boden 2004: ch. 9 ). The most important reason is the enormous complexity,a nd idiosyncracy, of human minds, the detailed contents of which are largely unknown event ot he individual concerned. Marcel Proust himself couldn'th av e predicted that a flood of memories would be prompted by his eating the famous madeleine. As for third-party observers, eveni f( which is unlikely) someone had happened to knowt hat he used to eat madeleines as a youth at his grandmother'shouse, theytoo would have been unable to predict the host of mental associations that were triggered by his eating them again in adult life. Even if only one thought is of interest, psychological complexity may hide it from view: the very best clinical psychologist may not knowwhether or not Jo Bloggs will decide to commit suicide--still less just when, and how.
In one sense, this does put creativity outside the scope of science. However, that'sn or eason for the scientist to despair--and no reason to mark creativity offf rom other,n otionally less mysterious, phenomena. For it'sn ot the aim of science to predict individual events--most of which, unlikeJoBloggs' suicide, are of no interest to us, anyway: we don't want physicists to be able to predict the movements of each grain of sand on the beach. (Even if the suicidal thoughts are assigned some statistical probability, this may not be calculated on purely scientific grounds: Meehl 1954.) Occasionally,e vents can be precisely predicted by science: think of a returning space-capsule, splashing into the Pacific Ocean with rescue-ships already waiting nearby. Usually,h owev er, theyc annot. Science in general isn'tf ocussed on the prediction of particularities, event hough prediction is an important aspect of experimental method. Rather,i t seeks to showh ow events of a certain class are possible, and howt heya re related to other sorts of event, whether actual or merely conceivable (Boden 2006: 7. iii.d).
Accordingly,an euroscientific explanation of the puzzling phenomenon of creativity would showus how it is possible for this still-mysterious phenomenon to occur.The common viewthat as cience of creativity could predict every detail of creative thought, thus making human artists and scientists (and everyday punsters ...) redundant, is mistaken.
The "mystery" of creativity,a sr eg ards neuroscience, lies not in its unpredictability but in its computational variety.A so utlined in Section II below, there are several different types of creativity,i nv olving distinct sorts of information processing. A satisfactory neuroscience of creativity would have toilluminate each one of these.
"Illumination", here, means significantly more than locating the brain-areas involved. In general, a neuroscientific explanation of a psychological phenomenon does not merely tell us which parts of the brain, and/or which neuronal groups, are active when the phenomenon occurs. Crucially,ittells us what the brain-cells aredoing, where this is understood not in terms of (for instance) chemical changes but in terms of the computations, or information processing, that the cells are performing (Boden 2006: ch. 14) .
The computational psychologist John Mayhew, when explaining stereopsis, put it liket his: "Finding a cell that recognizes one'sg randmother does not tell you very much more than you started with; after all, you knowy ou can recognize your grandmother.W hat is needed is an answer to howy ou, or a cell, or anything at all, does it. The discovery of the cell tells one what does it, but not howitcan be done" (Mayhew1983: 214).
Even if the detailed neuronal circuits involved are known, what the circuits ared oing may be obscure. The key questions concern what information is receivedand/or passed on by the cell or cell-group, and howi t'sc omputed by them. Put another way,t heyc oncern "howe lectrical and chemical signals are used in the brain to represent and process information" (Koch and Segev 1989: 1).
The key point of this paper,then, is that we need to know what sort of information processing is involved in creativity,t oh av e anyh ope of a neuroscientific explanation of it. And the conclusion will be that we are at present within reach of such an explanation only for one type of creativity.The others will be much more difficult nuts for the neuroscientist to crack.
II: The three types of creativity
Creativity can happen in three main ways, only one of which is typically recognized by people trying to analyse it (including those experimental psychologists who specialize in this area). Specifically,c reativity may be combinational, exploratory,o rt ransformational (Boden 2004: chaps. 3-6) .
These are distinguished by the sorts of psychological process that are involved in generating the newi dea. A satisfactory neuroscientific theory of creativity would need to explain howe ach of the three types can come about.
Combinational creativity--which is usually the only type recognized in studies/definitions of creativity--involves the generation of unfamiliar combinations of familiar ideas. In general, it givesr ise to a "statistical" form of surprise, liket hat experienced when an outsider wins the Derby.E veryday examples of combinational creativity include visual collage (in advertisements and MTV videos, for instance); much poetic imagery; all types of analogy (verbal, visual, or musical) ; and the unexpected juxtapositions of ideas found in political cartoons in newspapers. Scientific examples include seeing the heart as a pump, or the atom as a solar system. Exploratory and transformational creativity are different. Unliket he combinational variety, they're both grounded in some previously existing, and culturally accepted, structured style of thinking, or "conceptual space". Of course, combinational creativity,t oo, depends on a shared conceptual base--but this is, potentially,t he entire range of concepts and world-knowledge in someone'sm ind. A conceptual space, or thinking-style, is both more limited and more tightly structured (often, hierarchically). It may be a board-game, for example (chess or Go, perhaps), or aclass of chemical structures (aromatic molecules, for instance), or a particular type of music or sculpture.
In exploratory creativity,t he existing stylistic rules or conventions are used to generate novel structures (ideas or artefacts), whose possibility may or may not have been realized before the exploration took place. Tothe extent that it was not, the newstructure will be not only satisfying buts urprising. A newp ainting in the Impressionist style, a newb enzene derivative,o ran ew fugue or sonnet are all examples. So is the daily generation of news entences, fitting the grammatical rules of the language in question.
Exploratory creativity can also involvethe search for,and testing of, the specific stylistic limits concerned. Just which types of structure can be generated within this space, and which cannot?
Transformational creativity is the most arresting of the three. Indeed, it leads to "impossibilist" surprise, wherein the noveli dea appears to be not merely new, not evenm erely strange, but impossible. Seemingly,i ts imply could not have arisen--and yet it did. In such cases, the shocking newidea arose because some defining dimension of the style, or conceptual space, was altered--so that structures can nowbegenerated which could not be generated before. The greater the alteration, and the more fundamental the stylistic dimension concerned, the greater the shock of impossibilist surprise.
Fori nstance, imagine altering the rule of chess which says that pawns can'tj ump overo ther pieces: they're nowa llowed to do this, as knights always were. The result would be that some games of chess could nowb ep layed which were literally impossible before. Or consider the suggestion, newi n1 865, that the benzene molecule may be a ring of carbon atoms: a topologically closed string, rather than--likea ll previously described molecules--an open one. Exploratory creativity then took over, aso rg anic chemists mapped the space of benzene derivatives. (Theyl ater went on to ask whether the core of some ring-molecules might include fivea toms rather than six, and/or atoms of elements other than carbon. Whether one chooses to call those twoquestions "exploratory" or "transformational" is negotiable. The important point is that theyw ere both drivenb ys pecific features of the benzene-space that had been explored for some time.) Ac omparable, and much more recent, example concerns the shocking idea that some carbon molecules may be hollows pheres. The key transformation, here, was to consider atomic bonds forming not just in one spatial dimension (as in a planar sheet of graphene), but in three. What's generally regarded as the key paper was published in 1985 (Kroto et al. 1985) . It reported experimental research on carbon vapours heated to thousands of degrees, in which various multiatom molecules (but mostly the soccer-ball C60, or Buckminster-fullerene) formed spontaneously.Subsequent exploratory creativity synthesized manynew "fullerenes" of differing shapes and sizes. These included open-ended or closed tubes (formed when a fewp ercent of nickel or cobalt atoms were added) that could act as molecule-carriers and electronic conductors, so providing for a host of noveltechnological applications. This pioneering work led to a Nobel prize elevenyears later (Smalley1996).
That work was rightly seen by the Nobel committee as "pioneering", not least because of its detail and systematicity (made possible by the team'sd ev elopment of laser-instrumentation for measurement). In fact, however, the central "shocking idea" had been suggested in 1970, by chemists in Japan and in the UK. But it was then considered too bizarre to be accepted (valued) by the scientific community.M oreover, a closely similar idea, envisaging the addition of impurities to a planar network of carbon atoms (and soon pointing out that the resultant hollow molecules might carry other molecules inside them), had been published in the NewS cientist as early as 1966--but the author had presented this as scientific fantasy rather than serious research (Jones 1966; cf. Jones 1982: 118-119) . This example illustrates the difficulty,i nm anyc ases, of deciding whether a particular idea really is new, and/or really is valuable (see below).
In general (though less so in literature), transformational creativity is esteemed more highly than the other twov arieties. The people whose names are recorded in the history books are usually remembered above all for changing the accepted style. Typically,t he stylistic change meets initial resistance. And it often takes some time to be accepted. That'sn ow onder.F or transformational creativity by definition involves the breaking/ignoring of culturally sanctioned rules.
However, novelt ransformations are relatively rare. All artists and scientists spend most of their working time engaged in combinational and/or exploratory creativity.T hat'sa bundantly clear when one visits a painter'sretrospective exhibition, especially if the canvasses are displayed chronologically: one sees a certain style being adopted, and then explored, clarified, and tested. It may be superficially tweaked (a different palette adopted, for example). But it'so nly rarely that one sees a radical transformation taking place. Similarly,t he list of a scientist'sr esearch papers rarely includes a transformative contribution: mostly,scientists explore the implications of some already-accepted idea. Even if that idea is itself transformative,and relatively recent, it normally prompts exploration rather than further transformation. That was so in the case of ringmolecules, as we've seen; and the case-history of the fullerenes provides further illustrations.
(Only very seldom does an individual scientist, or artist, makem ore than one transformative move.P icasso is an example from the arts, who pioneered several distinct styles overh is lifetime. In science, the Crick-Watson team discovered both the double helix and, a fewy ears later,the genetic code.)
The sagao ft he fullerenes also illustrates the fact that identifying a "creative"i dea, or a scientific "discovery", is not always straightforward. Such judgments can evenb ea ffected by national rivalries, not to mention social snobbery and personal jealousies (Schaffer 1994) . The identification of creativity is never purely scientific. For event hough science can occasionally explain whywehav e certain values (shininess, for instance--see Boden 2006: 8.iv.c), it cannot, in principle, justify anyv alue. Moreover, our values often change: different social groups/subgroups, in differing times and places, may value very different things. Because the notion of positive valuation is included within the concept of creativity,the class of "creative"ideas is not anatural kind. In other words, it is not a purely scientific concept.
It follows that neuroscience could neverexplain the origin of creative ideas without some prior (socially based) judgements identifying these ideas as creative,i nc ontrast with others that are merely new. (Even novelty isn'ta lways easily judged, as the case-history of the fullerenes shows--see Boden 2006: 1.iii.f-g).
Afinal complication must be mentioned here. Namely,what we naturally think of as a "single" idea or artefact may involvem ore than one sort of creativity.T he three forms of creativity distinguished above are analytically distinct, in that theyinv olvedifferent types of psychological process for generating novelideas. But a givenartwork or scientific theory can involvemore than one type. That'spartly whyit'sgenerally more sensible to ask whether this or that aspect of the idea in question is creative,and in what way.Aneuroscientific theory of creativity should be able to showh ow the three forms of creativity can be integrated, as well as howt heyc an function independently.
III: What might neuroscience have tosay?
There'snodoubt that neuroscience could help to showhow combinational creativity is possible. Indeed, it already has. Neurological studies, and computer models, of associative memory have already thrown light on the mechanisms underlying much poetic imagery.
The richness and subtlety of these associations have long been appreciated by literary scholars. The best example, here, is John Livingstone Lowes' (1930) masterly literary detective story tracing the detailed origins of Samuel Taylor Coleridge'si magery in The Ancient Mariner and Kubla Khan (Boden 2004: ch. 6 ). In relation to the pessimism about particularism expressed in Section I, it'sw orth mentioning that this author had access not only to the whole of Coleridge's eclectic library but also to his commonplace books for the eighteen months during which these poems were written, in which he had jotted down quotations that had interested him. That degree of access to the detailed contents of another person'smind is highly unusual.
However, beyond the already long-familiar idea that brains are composed of interconnected units that are somehowresponsible for conceptual associations (Hartley1749), Livingston Lowes knewn othing of the neural mechanisms involved. Today,w ea re in a very different position. It wask nown by the 1980s that certain drugs can increase or decrease the associative range of conceptual thinking, leading to more or less inclusive and/or idiosyncratic combinations respectively (e.g. Shawetal. 1986; cf. Eysenck 1994: 224-232) . And now, wehav e much more data, and manymore neuroscientific (not least, neurocomputational) concepts, to work with.
This isn'ttosay that we can nowcome closer to literary particularism than Livingston Lowes, for instance, could. In other words, it'sn ot to say that neuroscience could evere xplain just how/why this idea was associated with that idea on a givenoccasion. Even if the idea in question could be neuronally located (as intentional verbs, for instance, have been located in the pSTS: Allison et al. 2000; Castelli et al. 2002; Frith and Frith 2003) , the specific association that arose in some individual'smind could not be explained in detail--still less, predicted. However, wesaw in Section I that particularist explanation/prediction is not the aim of science. Insofar as such particularist insights are available theyare post hoc, not predictive,and are to be found rather in the humanities (Livingstone Lowes' discussion of The Ancient Mariner provides some exceptionally convincing examples).
Associative pathways, however, are not all there is to combinational creativity.T here is also the trickyi ssue of relevance. Conceivably,a ny concept could be associated with anyo ther,b y some sufficiently tortuous neuronal path. In that sense, there'sn ol imit to the number of "unfamiliar combinations" that are possible. But life is too short to followo nly highly tortuous pathways. Even poets have toprovide enough context to maketheir meaning communicable; and ev eryday speech, in general, has to be understood immediately. In other words, those novel combinations which we value, so which we regard as "creative", invariably involve relevance--evenifthe relevance is not immediately apparent.
An insightful computational approach to relevance suggests that we have evolved an involuntary,a nd exceptionless, principle of communication (and problem-solving) based on a cost-benefit analysis, weighing effort against effect (Sperber and Wilson 1986) . The more information-processing effort it would taketobear x in mind in the context of y, the more costly this would be: and high cost givesl ow relevance. The more implications (regarding things of interest to the individual concerned) that would followf rom considering x, the more effective it would be: and high effectiveness giveshigh relevance.
The suggestion here is not (paradoxically) that we pre-compute just what effort/effect would be involved in considering a certain concept. Rather,t here must be psychological mechanisms ev olved for recognizing relevance. For example, our attention is naturally (sic) caught by movement, because moving things are often of interest. Similarly,e venan ewborn baby's attention is preferentially caught by human speech sounds. Besides being built into our sensory systems, relevance recognition is built into our memories: it'sn oa ccident, on this view, that similar and/or frequently co-occurring memories are easily accessible, being 'stored' together in scripts, schemas, and conceptual hierarchies.
Different cognitive strategies may vary in the measure of cost or benefit that theya ttach to a givenc onceptual 'distance'. Surrealists, for example, tolerate greater distances than straightforwardly 'representational' writers and painters do--hence the extreme unfamiliarity of the novelc ombinations found in their work. The artist'sp ersonal signature, which can affect manyd ifferent aspects of a creative work (see Boden 2010) , can apply here: one individual Surrealist may be evenm ore forgiving of conceptual distance than another.S imilarly,d ifferent rhetorical styles in literature involvedifferent levels of cost and/or different types of information processing in both writer and reader: compare Charles Dickens and James Joyce, for instance. (A literary personal signature may also involveap reference for finding manys orts of relevance in certain concepts: animals, for the poet Ted Hughes, for example.)
This analysis of relevance implies that, pace symbolic computationalists such as Jerry Fodor (1983) , laboured scientific inference is not ag ood model for everyday,i nstantaneous, understanding (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 66f.) . Similarly,i tr ejects the GOFAI assumption that deliberate reasoning (which is needed by literary scholars and historians when puzzling over obscure texts) is required for spontaneous interpretation (op.cit., p. 75). Rather,o ur understanding typically depends on associative,non-logical, guessing that is constrained by what we taketoberelevant.
It follows that a satisfactory neuroscientific account of combinational creativity would identify the various mechanisms evolved for judging relevance. Givent hat this matter is a verbal/conceptual version of the notorious frame problem (Sperber and Wilson 1996; Boden 2006 Boden : 771-5, 1003 , that is a tall order.
With respect to the other twof orms of creativity,t here'sm ore bad news. For theya re significantly less amenable to neuroscience. That'strue in twoways.
First, we rarely knowa ll the constraints defining the conceptual spaces of art or science, still less the computational processes required to explore and/or to transform them. Historians of art and musicologists spend lifetimes in attempting to makes tylistic constraints explicit, and succeed only to a very limited degree. Sometimes, theye vena nnounce a givens tyle to be unfathomable. For instance, an architectural historian specializing in Frank Lloyd Wright'swork announced the style (the principle of "balance") of his Prairie Houses to be "occult" (Hitchcock 1942) .
One of the advantages of computer modelling is that it can sometimes help to develop, and to test, explicit theories about such matters. So, for instance, a computerised "shape grammar" has generated every one of Lloyd Wright'sf orty-or-so Prairie House designs, plus manyo thers clearly sharing the same style--without everproducing one that lacks this intuitively recognizable principle of unity (Koning and Eizenberg1 981) . Moreover, this work has shown that the fireplace is key tot he style. That is, when generating specific design-choices, changes to the location of the fireplace (or to the number of fireplaces) result in changes to most other aspects of the house.
The second type of "bad news" is that, eveni fw eh ad defined the conceptual spaces concerned, and eveni fw ek newt he generative processes involved in negotiating and changing them, we wouldn'tk nowh ow these are neurally embodied. Wem ight assign them to some central cognitive workspace (e.g. Baars 1988 , Changeux 2002 , to be sure. And we might even be able to locate that workspace, very broadly,i nt he brain. But knowing just hows onnet-form, for instance, is neurally embodied, and howi ti sn europhysiologically accessed in generating "Shall I compare thee to a summer'sday?", is way beyond the state of the art. This is not just a difficulty in particularistic prediction, as discussed above:r ather,i t'sa difficulty in knowing how it is possible for neurological mechanisms to implement sonnet-form, and to exploit it so as to generate the line in question. Similarly,e xplaining--in neurological terms--just howt he Prairie House style can generate the Henderson house, the Martin house, or the Baker house (different examples, each named after the clients who commissioned them) is at present beyond us.
My own viewisthat it is likely to remain so for very manyyears, perhaps evenforever. That's not because I agree with those philosophers (e.g. McGinn 1989 McGinn , 1991 who argue that the explanation of high-levelt hought and consciousness is as far beyond the cognitive capacities of Homo sapiens as theoretical physics is beyond the capacities of squirrels and chimpanzees. I believe that position to be unnecessarily defeatist. Nevertheless, there are some fundamental problems here, which can'tb es olved by (theory-free) correlative brain-imaging, nor by reference, for example, to trial-and-error combinations and neural evolution (Changeux 1994) .
One of these problems concerns the neural implementation of hierarchy. Most of the styles, or conceptual spaces, explored in art and science are hierarchical. The Prairie House fireplace, for instance, is key tot he genre because it lies at a fundamental leveli nt he stylistic hierarchy( the "space grammar") concerned, so that a decision about the fireplace will constrain manyl ater decisions about other,s uperficially unrelated, matters. And the generation of "Shall I compare thee to a summer'sd ay?" requires exploration of grammatical hierarchy. Atp resent, we have no good ideas about howc onceptual hierarchies are neurally embodied, nor howt heyc an be rationally negotiated in creative thinking.
Still less do we knowh ow transformational procedures may be embodied which can alter those hierarchies. Even domain-general transformations (such as consider the negative or drop a constraint) are a mystery.A nd the neural basis of the manyd omain-specific procedures that led from early Renaissance music (broadly: one composition, one key), through increasingly daring modulations and harmonies, to atonal music is evenm ore elusive (Rosen 1976; Boden 2004: 71-74) .
One might suggest, at this point, that computer simulation could help. And in principle, it could. However, a neuroscientifically plausible model is going to be connectionist rather than symbolic. Yet only symbolic models (a.k.a. GOFAI, or Good Old-Fashioned AI--Haugeland 1985: 112) are well-suited to represent hierarchy. Connectionist models, in general, are not. Despite heroic efforts in that direction, this problem has not yet been solved (Boden 2006: 12.viii) . Perhaps the most impressive attempt is HarmonyT heory (Smolenskye ta l. 1993; Smolenskya nd Legendre: 2006) , which draws on neuroscientific knowledge. However, this was specifically developed to deal with grammatical hierarchy( syntax), and it'sn ot clear howi t could be generalized to model conceptual hierarchies such as artistic/scientific styles.
Even if it could, there would be a huge gap between harmony-theoretic modelling and the neurological reality.M ost connectionist models, especially those intended as models of psychological (not just neurological) functions, rely on computational units which--as compared with real neurons--are too neat, too simple, too few, and too 'dry' (Boden 2006: 14.ii) . In brief, the networks studied by connectionist AI are very non-neural nets.
To bes ure, connectionism is becoming gradually more realistic. One recent textbook, featuring the Leabra software system developed by its authors, makes great efforts to integrate connectionist AI with neuroscience (O'Reilly and Munakata 2000) . For example, the activation function controlling the spiking of the simulated neurons in Leabra is only "occasionally" drawn from mathematical connectionism (p. 42). Usually,i ti sb ased on facts about the biological machinery for producing a spike, including detailed data on ion channels, membrane potentials, conductance, leakages, and other electrical properties of nervec ells (pp. 32-48) . Similarly,t he basic equations used by Leabra when simulating high-levelp henomena such as reading or conceptual memory are (usually) painstakingly drawn from detailed biophysical data. This is true, for example, of the equation used for integrating manyi nputs into a single neuron (see the authors' explanation of equation 2.8 on pp. 37 ff.).
The Leabra authors drewthe line at applying this equation "at every point along the dendrites and cell body of the neuron, along with additional equations that specify howt he membrane potential spreads along neighbouring points of the neuron" (p. 38). Theyh ad no wish "to implement hundreds or thousands of equations to implement a single neuron," so used an approximating equation instead. But, characteristically,t heyp rovided references to other books which did explain howtoimplement such detailed single-neuron simulations.
In general, the psychological models developed by O'Reilly and Munakata would have been different had the neuroscientific data been different. Their discussion of dyslexia, for instance, built not only on previous connectionist work (e.g. Plaut and Shallice 1993; Plaut et al. 1996) , buta lso on recent clinical and neurological information (pp. 331-341). As our knowledge of the brain advances, future psychological models--theyb elieve--will, or anyway should, be different again. Theysee their book as "a 'first draft' of a coherent framework for computational cognitive neuroscience" (p. 11).
With respect to creativity,t his implies that we may hope for future connectionist models that embody specific neuroscientific data as well as ab etter understanding of the complex computational processes involved in all three types of creativity.But to hope is not to have.(And I'm not holding my breath.)
IV:Wittgenstein and neuroscience
I've assumed so far that it is coherent to aim for a neuroscientific explanation of creativity--and, for that matter,o fa ny other psychological phenomenon. In other words, such an explanation is possible in principle, irrespective ofw hether it has been, or is everl ikely to be, achieved. And I've written as though the only reason for denying this is the mysterian viewt hat there is something essentially quasi-magical about creativity,which puts it beyond the reach of science.
However, manyp hilosophers of mind would denyt he possibility of a scientific understanding of creativity--and of anyo ther psychological phenomenon--on very different grounds. These writers include the followers of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who suggested in his Philosophical Investigations (1953) that there is no levelo fp sychological explanation between remarks about conscious phenomenology and observations about the physical mechanisms of the brain. So, for instance, Richard Rorty explicitly looked forward to "the disappearance of psychology as a discipline distinct from neurology" (1979: 121).
Wittgensteinians in general reject psychological explanations posed at the sub-personal level, so criticize those neuroscientific theories which define brain-processes cognitively (or computationally), rather than purely neurologically.T heya ccuse neuroscientists of incoherence due to the "mereological fallacy", which is to attribute to a part of a system some predicate which is properly attributed only to the whole (Bennett and Hacker 2003) . In this context, the "system" in question is the whole person, the "parts" are the brain (or parts thereof), and the "predicates" are psychological terms such as knowledge, memory,b elief, reasoning, choice--and, of course, creativity.
On this view, there is absolutely no hope of a naturalistic psychology.I nsofar as psychology exists as a scientific discipline it is said to be a hermeneutic, not a natural science (cf. McDowell 1994; Harre 2002) . So neuroscience could never replace psychology,inthe sense of substituting for it. At most, a (non-cognitivist) neuroscience could compensate for the lack of a cognitivist (sub-personal) psychology.
This rejection of naturalism in psychology reflects a deep divide in western philosophy, which we can'tg oi nto here (but see Boden 2006: 16.vi-viii) . A fewn euroscientists (such as followers of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela: 1980) lie on the anti-naturalist side of the divide. But the vast majority do not. Moreover, neuroscience itself has become increasingly cognitivist--indeed, computational--since the 1950s (Boden 2006: ch. 14) . Information-processes and computational mechanisms are nowconsidered crucial in manyneuroscientific explanations, from studies of vision to the higher thought processes. And this paper has argued that the computational leveloftheorizing is crucial in explaining creativity,too.
So although Wittgenstein might seem at first sight to be the neuroscientist'sfriend, perhaps he is not such a good friend after all. Not a false friend, to be sure (for that would involveinsincerity or betrayal). But, in my view, a mistaken one.
V: Conclusion
Nothing that'sb een said above suggests that there can neverb ean euroscience of creativity. Indeed, a neuroscience of combinational creativity is arguably within sight--if not yet within reach.
It'sn ot yet in reach, partly because--as explained in Section III--there are challenging problems concerning howw em akej udgments of relevance when engaging in, or appreciating, combinational creativity.An euroscientific explanation of that is not within sight. Moreover, giventhat this is a verbal/conceptual version of the notorious frame problem (Sperber and Wilson 1996; Boden 2006 Boden : 771-5, 1003 , it is a tall order.
Further reasons whyan euroscience of creativity is not within reach involveh ierarchy, as we've seen. Clearly,i tm ust be possible, somehow, for hierarchy--and all other aspects of symbolic thinking--to be implemented in (broadly) connectionist systems. After all, the human brain is such a system. However, weneed to understand, much better than we do at present, how ab asically connectionist system can emulate a symbolic one (howc onnectionism can emulate a vonNeumann machine).
In addition to highly general questions such as that one, we need to focus on the specific structure of, and the generative processes within, the myriad conceptual spaces underlying science and art. For neither exploratory nor transformational creativity can be properly understood without taking those computational features into account.
